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Abstract
The paper discusses the structure, applications, and plausibility of the much-
used parallel-case argument for workplace democracy. The argument rests 
on an analogy between firms and states according to which the justification 
of democracy in the state implies its justification in the workplace. The 
contribution of the paper is threefold. First, the argument is illustrated by 
applying it to two usual objections to workplace democracy, namely, that 
employees lack the expertise required to run a firm and that only capital 
suppliers should have a say over the governance of the firm. Second, 
the structure of the argument is unfolded. Third, two salient similarities 
between firms and states regarding their internal and external effects and 
the standing of their members are addressed in order to asses the potential 
and limits of the argument, as well as three relevant differences regarding 
the voluntariness of their membership, the narrowness of their goals, and 
the stiffness of the competition they face. After considering these similarities 
and differences, the paper contends that the the parallel-case argument 
provides a sound reason in favor of democracy in the workplace —a reason, 
however, that needs to be importantly qualified and that is only pro tanto.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decades democracy has rapidly expanded worldwide. While 
in 1946 only 20 out of 71 independent states were democratic, the number 
increased to 48 in 1989, to 77 in 1994, and to 92 in 2009 (Marshall and Cole 
2009: 10-11). The expansion of democracy in the state, however, has not gone 
hand-in-hand with a parallel expansion of democracy in other realms, such 
as the workplace. 1 Rather the contrary. The number of cooperatives may 
have decreased over the last decades. 2 And attempts to extend the German 
system of co-determination have either been blocked —as in the case of 
the Fifth Directive drafted by the European Community in the 1970s— or 
failed altogether —as in the case of the Bullock Report in the UK (Gold 2005; 
2010). Further, once a battle cry among workers and a central research topic 
in industrial relations, labor economics, and political philosophy (Christie 
1984: 112-128), since the 1980s workplace democracy has attracted a 
declining interest among scholars, political parties, and workers alike. 
Yet, the recent resilience of co-operatives to the Great Recession has 
strengthened their presence in the world economy, and has aroused the 
interest in this and other forms of workplace democracy once again (Birchall 
and Ketilson 2009; Lansbury 2009; Birchall 2013). Some recent philosophical 
work on economic and workplace democracy has also contributed to the 
debate (Hsieh 2008; Schaff 2012; Perry 2014; Anderson, forthcoming; 
Landemore and Ferreras, unpublished; see also the essays in Gosseries and 
Ponthiere 2008; and O’Neill and Williamson 2012: Part II).
Among those who have championed the idea, some have called into 
question the consistency between the widespread commitment to democracy 
in the state and the skepticism with which its extension to the workplace is 
nowadays received. Indeed, it has been argued that firms’ decisions influence 
workers’ lives as much as governments’ decisions; that managers have as much 
power over workers as public officials have over citizens; or that large companies 
influence the society as much as the state does. 3 From this point of view, non-
democratic firms have sometimes been depicted as autocratic institutions 
within which the economy is centrally planned, freedom of movement and 
speech is heavily constrained, and failure to obey can result in instant exile. 4
1. Democracy is minimally defined throughout the paper as a form of collective decision-
making that gives a binding say to all the affected and/or subjected individuals on a roughly 
equal basis.
2. For some evidence in the US farming context, see United States Department of Agricul-
ture (2004).
3. For references, see section 4, in which these arguments are discussed.
4. Noam Chomsky (1998: 19) has expressed this view as follows: “What kind of freedom is 
there inside a corporation? They’re totalitarian institutions —you take orders from above and 
maybe give them to people below you. There’s about as much freedom as under Stalinism”.
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However, there may be good reasons against democracy in the workplace 
that do not apply to the state, and the converse may also be true. Indeed, 
it has been often claimed that firms and states are too different for the 
analogy between them to work. For example, it has been argued that firms 
are voluntary associations while states are not, that firms are for-profit while 
states are not, and that firms are meritocratic while states are not. 5
The goal of this paper is to analyze the structure, applications, and 
limits of the analogy between states and firms that is often used to argue 
for workplace democracy, i.e. what Joshua Cohen (1989) has labeled 
as the parallel-case argument for workplace democracy. 6 According 
to this argument, firms and states have a number of similarities that 
make any argument against workplace democracy plausible either in 
both realms or in neither realm. In this paper I will advance a qualified 
defense of the parallel-case argument. As I shall argue, firms and states 
are analogous regarding two salient features (their internal effects and 
the exercise of power within them). In addition, I will address a number 
of potential differences between them (regarding the voluntariness of 
their membership, the narrowness of their goals, and the toughness of the 
competition they face) that may block the analogy on which the argument 
is based. I will contend that, while relevant, these differences are often 
overdrawn, for they are of degree, not of kind. I will conclude that the 
parallel-case argument provides a sound, yet qualified and non-decisive, 
basis in favor of workplace democracy.
The paper is divided into five further sections. Section 2 briefly defines 
workplace democracy and illustrates the parallel-case argument by applying 
it to two common arguments against workplace democracy. Section 3 
unfolds the structure of the argument. Section 4 discusses two salient 
analogies, while section 5 tackles three potential differences between firms 
and states. A conclusion closes the paper.
2. THE PARALLEL-CASE ARGUMENT AT WORK
This section has two goals. It firstly introduces the definition of workplace 
democracy that will be used throughout the paper. It then illustrates the 
parallel-case argument by applying it to two influential arguments against 
workplace democracy. (Those who are familiar with these issues may want 
to directly turn to section 3). Workplace democracy is defined as follows:
5. For references, see section 5, in which these arguments are discussed.
6. The argument has been most recently employed by Schaff (2012), and assessed by 
Landemore and Ferreras (unpublished). The classice references defending it are Walzer (1983) 
and Dahl (1985). For a detailed critique, see López-Guerra (2008).
 Firms, States, and Democracy 35
LEAP 2 (2014)
Workplace democracy: A form of managerial organization in which 
workers have control rights over the management of the firm. 
Workplace democracy has developed into many different forms since 
its nineteenth-century origins, including Robert Owen’s cooperative 
experiments, the Israeli kibbutzim, the German co-determination system, 
and the US Employee Stock Ownership Plans (Dow 2003; Hansmann 2000; 
Wilkinson et al., 2010: part III). The above definition is, thus, a fairly minimal 
and inclusive one. Even though it rules out forms of participation that are 
limited to employee information, communication, and/or consultation, 
it leaves open a large number of issues regarding the goals, procedures, 
and boundary conditions of workplace democracy. It also leaves open 
the relationship between ownership and control rights. Hence, under this 
definition workers are not required to have a share in the ownership of the 
firm in order to be granted control rights. They may be granted control rights 
either qua owners or qua workers. 
The best-known instance of the first alternative is co-operativism, in 
which workers —and only workers— have equal control rights and supply 
capital, e.g. via debt contracting or by drawing upon their own savings. 7 
Co-determination, on the other hand, provides the closest instance of the 
second alternative, in which workers are granted control rights without 
making any equity investment in the firm. 8
Many arguments have been advanced in favor of these and other forms of 
workplace democracy. 9 Unlike other arguments, the appeal of the parallel-case 
argument is that, by tracing a tight analogy between firms and states, it moves 
the debate on the desirability of workplace democracy to the political realm, 
in which the desirability of democracy is taken for granted. In addition, since 
some of the arguments that are used nowadays against workplace democracy 
are very similar to arguments that were once used against democracy in the 
state yet are now seen as unacceptable and anachronistic, the parallel-case 
argument suggests that we may be using such arguments uncritically.
7. However, as Elster (1989) recalls, only rarely we find cooperatives so-defined, for non-
working owners, non-owning workers, and unequal distribution of shares are common.
8. The best-known case of co-determination is the German system (Dow 2003: chapter 4; 
Fitzroy and Kraft 2005). In force since 1976, it makes compulsory for all limited liability firms 
with over 2,000 workers to have a supervisory board with ample powers (e.g. the approval of 
the annual budget or the ratification of important investments) in which both shareholders 
and workers are represented on a “near-parity” basis (because exclusively the shareholders 
elect the chairman of the board, who has a tie-breaking vote). For a theoretical model of co-
determination with a more equal distribution of control rights among shareholders and 
employees, see Ferreras 2012. 
9. For overviews of recent normative debates, see Dow 2003: chapter 2; Hsieh 2008, and 
González-Ricoy 2010.
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In order to illustrate this, let us assume for a moment that the argument 
is sound, and briefly apply it to two usual arguments against workplace 
democracy, namely, that employees often lack the expertise required 
to run a firm (call it the epistemic argument) and that only shareholders 
should have control rights for they are the only suppliers of capital (call it 
the argument from capital supply). (Just to be clear, in this section I will not 
assess the merits of the parallel-case argument, something that will only 
be done in the next section. I only show how the argument could be used 
if it were sound.)
2.1. The Epistemic Argument
Firms are complex institutions that operate in constantly changing 
economic environments. Their management involves decisions about 
investment policies, production engineering, contracting, compensation, 
and budgetary planning, among many other technical and complex issues. 
Why, then, should workers be granted a say in their governance when they 
often lack the expertise required to make informed decisions about such 
issues? As an executive commented, “What? And let the monkeys run the 
zoo!” (quoted in Christie 1984: 115). According to the epistemic argument,
(A1)  Complex institutions should not be governed by those who lack 
the expertise to govern them sufficiently well (i.e. to at least some 
specific level of competency). 
(A2)  Firms are complex institutions and workers lack the expertise to 
govern them sufficiently well.
Therefore, 
(A3)  Firms should not be governed by their workers.
However, consistently extended, (A1) allows for an analogous criticism of 
democracy in the state. Put simply, 
(A4)  States are also complex institutions and not all citizens have the 
political expertise required to govern them sufficiently well. 
Therefore, 
(A5)  States should not be governed by all their citizens.
As we shall see below in section 3, it is possible to resist (A5) by claiming that 
(A1) applies differently to firms and states due to certain relevant differences 
between them. For example, efficiency may be crucial in the firm yet not in 
the state and, accordingly, expertise may be crucial in governing the firm yet 
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not in governing the state. Since the goal of this subsection is just to illustrate 
how the parallel-case argument could be employed if it were sound, let us 
assume that (A1) applies equally to both domains. Two possible reactions 
follow to (A5). On the one hand, it is possible to accept (A1)-(A5). This was 
common until not so long ago. For instance, in defending the restoration 
of suffrage restrictions in France right after the Thermidorian coup of 
1794, Boissy d’Anglas (1795) famously stated that “we must be governed by 
the best, and the best are the more educated”. Jason Brennan (2011) has 
recently argued similarly. However, on the other hand, it is possible to deny 
that it is permissible to disenfranchise some group of voters regardless of 
how competently they cast their vote, thus rejecting (A5), which most of 
us would nowadays do. Now, from the latter option it follows that, if (A2) is 
true, then
(A6)  (A1) should be rejected, i.e. expertise should not be a necessary 
condition for the governance of complex institutions.
It may be further replied that (A1)-(A5) is too radical an argument, for 
some degree of insulation of expertise from democratic control may 
not be at odds with political equality, as the insulation of central banks 
and constitutional courts from parliamentary decision-making in most 
democracies proves. This is surely a controversial argument, since it might 
be argued that the insulation of expertise from democratic control does 
pose a constraint on political equality, even though such constraint may 
be justified for reasons other than political equality. However, for present 
purposes, it is irrelevant whether the argument is sound or not. For, even 
if it were, it would also apply to firms, given that certain tasks can also be 
insulated from workers’ control in democratic firms. Jeffrey Moriarty (2007: 
344) has made the following claim along those lines: “It would be just as 
unwise to allow employees to elect their firm’s Chief Financial Officer as it 
would be to allow citizens to elect their country’s Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board”.
The parallel-case argument does not imply that democratic firms ought 
to include this sort of insulation. It only shows that the scope and limits 
of democracy and the precise mechanisms of accountability that are to 
be used are as up for grabs in democratic firms as they are in democratic 
states. As Walzer (1983: 302) points out, “in a developed economy, as in 
a developed polity, different decisions are made by different groups of 
people at different levels of society. The division of power in both cases is 
only in part a matter of principle; it is also a matter of circumstance and 
convenience”.
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2.2. The Argument from Capital Supply 
The parallel-case argument can be similarly applied to the argument against 
workplace democracy from capital supply, according to which workers 
should not be granted control rights over the governance of the firm because 
they supply labor but not capital. Workers can always choose to work for 
democratic firms, take over their own firm in case it goes bankrupt, or try 
to get a majority of its voting shares. As Nozick (1974: 250) put it, “persons 
may form their own democratically-run cooperative firms. It is open to any 
wealthy radical or group of workers to buy an existing factory or establish a 
new one, and to institute their favorite microindustrial scheme; for example, 
worker-controlled, democratically-run firms”. In capitalist firms, however, 
shareholders supply capital. Accordingly, only they should govern the firm. 
In short, according to the argument from capital supply, 
(B1)  Only those who supply capital should govern the firm. 
(B2)  Workers supply labor but not capital to the firm. 
Therefore, 
(B3)  Workers should not govern the firm.
Before turning to the parallel-case argument against (B3), the following caveat 
is required. Even if we accepted that only shareholders should have control 
rights over the governance of the firm, it might be argued that workplace 
democracy need not trump such rights, for it need not be compulsory. 
True, some (for example, Cohen 1989) have argued for an inalienable right 
to workplace democracy. Yet it might be argued that workplace democracy 
can be implemented gradually and voluntarily, by means of providing 
legal advice, tax benefits, or direct subsidies to democratic firms, rather 
than, say, through expropriation or prohibition of non-democratic ones 
(see Bowles and Gintis 1996: 66). Now, even when workplace democracy is 
not compulsory, a rationale is still required to justify why the state should 
promote democratic firms at the expense of non-democratic ones. To 
be sure, there is a notable difference between using state coercion to ban 
non-democratic firms, on the one hand, and using its public resources to 
promote democratic firms at the expense of non-democratic ones. However, 
in both cases public means are used to benefit one managerial option at the 
expense of the other. Hence, the argument from capital supply still poses 
a potential threat to the justification of a non-mandatory-yet-publicly-
promoted workplace democracy. 10
10. I am grateful to Joseph Mazor for pressing me to clarify this.
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Let us now go back to premise (B1), according to which supply of capital 
implies exclusive control rights over the governance of the firm. As in the 
case of (A1), consistently extended, (B1) leads to a similar criticism in the 
political realm. The following one: 
(B4)  Not all citizens contribute equally to the revenue of the state, if at 
all. 
Therefore, 
(B5)  Not all citizens should govern the state.
Again, assume that firms and states are similarly enough for (B1) to apply 
to both realms. If so, we are again faced with two options. On the one 
hand, we can accept (B5). This has been a usual way to argue for property 
and tax qualifications for voting throughout history. John Jay’s “favorite 
maxim”, according to which “those who own the country ought to govern 
it”, largely expressed what was common sense until nineteenth —and 
twentieth— century extensions of the franchise (Jay, 1833: 70). Few would 
accept (B5) nowadays though. Now, if we reject (B5), then it follows that 
(B6)  Premise (B2) should also be rejected, i.e. supply of capital should 
not be a necessary condition to govern the firm.
3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PARALLEL-CASE ARGUMENT
As we have just seen, by tracing a close analogy between firms and states, 
the parallel-case argument pushes the debate on the desirability of 
democracy in the workplace to the political realm, in which democracy 
is the default normative position. Further, since some of the arguments 
that are used nowadays against democracy in the workplace, such as 
the epistemic argument and the argument from capital supply, closely 
resemble arguments that were once used against democracy in the state 
yet few would accept nowadays, the argument suggests that we may be 
using such arguments uncritically. In this section I unfold the structure 
of the argument. 
Robert Dahl (1985: 111) provides the best-known account of the parallel-
case argument, according to which “If democracy is justified in governing 
the state, then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprises; 
and to say that it is not justified in governing economic enterprises is to imply 
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that it is not justified in governing the state”. Of course, the second sentence 
is redundant. It is just a different yet logically equivalent way to express the 
material conditional stated in the previous sentence, namely, that
Parallel-case argument: If democracy is justified in governing the state, 
then it is justified in governing economic enterprises.
Further, even though Dahl formulates it in merely conditional terms, his 
discussion of the PCA favors a biconditional conclusion. As López-Guerra 
(2008: 15) points out, it would be certainly awkward if Dahl agreed that 
democracy could be justified in the workplace yet not in the state, as 
mere conditionality implies. Even though the previous definition of the 
argument is enough for the goals of this paper, the following modified 
version of it follows:
Strong parallel-case argument: Democracy is justified in governing the 
state if and only if it is justified in governing economic enterprises.
What links the antecedent and the consequent is that economic enterprises 
and states are taken to be analogous in some morally relevant sense. The 
parallel-case argument is thus an analogical argument. It refers to some 
similarities between two objects or systems of objects —namely, firms and 
states— in support of the conclusion that some further similarity exists (see 
Bartha 2010: chapter 1). It unfolds as follows:
(C1)  Economic enterprises are similar to the state regarding certain 
features.
(C2)   Such features are individually sufficient to justify democracy in 
governing the state.
Therefore, 
(C3)  Such features are individually sufficient to justify democracy in 
governing economic enterprises.
For this version of the argument to avoid being invalid, at least one further 
condition needs to obtain. In addition to their similarity regarding certain 
features that are sufficient to justify democracy in the state, firms and states 
ought to be similar regarding the absence of a number of aspects that may 
block the justification of democracy in either realm. For example, it may 
be the case that being subject to certain form of power by public officials 
is sufficient to justify democracy in the state, and that managers exercise 
the same sort of power in the firm. However, it may also be the case that 
democracy is inappropriate to govern firms because of the stiff competition 
they face in the market, while it is not to govern the state because states 
 Firms, States, and Democracy 41
LEAP 2 (2014)
do not face such competition in the international sphere, and that this 
difference is sufficiently strong to override the similarity regarding the sort 
of power exercised in both spheres.
In the next section I will consider two potentially relevant similarities 
between firms and states —regarding their effects and regarding the standing 
of their members. In the next one, I will turn to three potentially defeating 
differences between states and economic enterprises. Before turning to 
these similarities and differences, a caveat is nonetheless in order. 11 
The plausibility of the conclusions drawn from the argument depends on 
the moral relevance of the similarities and differences under consideration 
for the justification of democracy in either realm. Hence, it might be argued 
that the features considered below in this section —even when similarly 
present in firms and states— are irrelevant for the justification of workplace 
democracy because different governance schemes (notably, workplace 
democracy and political democracy) ought to be assessed according different 
moral criteria. An argument of this type has been advanced by López-Guerra 
(2008), who concedes that firms and states might be similar regarding one 
of the features that will be considered below, namely the exercise of power 
within them. Yet, he argues, economic justice, and not the exercise of power, 
should be the criterion employed in assessing the organization of the 
firm. Accordingly, the parallel-case argument fails because it overlooks the 
possibility that certain features that are morally relevant for the assessment 
of some governance schemes may be irrelevant —or not relevant enough 
to override some further differences that are morally more relevant— when 
assessing other schemes.
Two replies can be advanced. The first one is that López-Guerra’s 
argument is compatible with the argument presented in this paper. The 
reason for this is that here I assume a pluralistic view of the values that are 
morally relevant to the assessment of democracy. Hence, as it will become 
apparent immediately below, my goal is not to assess if the features that 
I consider below are morally relevant for the justification of democracy. 
I make the normative assumption that they are, and that they need to 
be balanced against each other (something that I do not attempt to do 
here either). My goal here is rather to analyze if such features are similarly 
present in firms and states. If the normative assumption turned out to be 
wrong, then the conclusions drawn from the present analysis would have 
to be recon sidered.
The second reply is that, even if we accepted López-Guerra’s argument, 
the parallel-case argument could still hold. López-Guerra seems to believe 
that, if we prove that the exercise of power is not a relevant moral criterion 
11. I am grateful to a referee for this journal for pressing me to introduce this caveat.
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(or not relevant enough to override some other criteria), we then also prove 
that the argument is invalid. But this is because he explicitly assumes that the 
parallel between firms and states has to be based on the exercise of power. 
To be sure, this has been the main basis in the existing literature, in which 
it has been assumed that democracy should be equally applied to firms and 
states because the same sort of power is exercised in both realms. However, 
there is no reason why the parallel-case argument could not be based on 
the similarity between firms and states regarding some other moral criteria 
(for example, how profoundly the decisions made by firms and states affect 
workers and citizens, respectively). And, once we accept this, it may be the 
case that firms and states are similar enough regarding these further criteria 
to make the argument work.
4. SIMILARITIES
Firms and states are similar in a number of ways. 12 However, not all the 
features that firms and states share are equally suitable to be included in 
this category. These should be limited to those features that may satisfy 
premise (C2), i.e. those features that may be sufficient for the justification 
of democracy in the state. Now, different normative theories of democracy 
will provide different accounts of which precise features count as sufficient 
in justifying democracy in the state. For instance, pure instrumentalist 
theories will consider only process-independent features, such as welfare 
maximization or the protection of fundamental rights, while non-
instrumentalist theories will look at process-related features, such as the 
exercise of power by public officials. 
In the remainder of this subsection I will consider two similarities that 
have dominated recent debates and that are plausible candidates to justify 
democracy in the state. More specifically, I will briefly consider, first, the 
external and internal effects of firms and states and, second, the power 
exercised by managers and public officials.
4.1. Effects
Let us begin with one of the several principles by which democracy has 
been justified in the state. According to the principle of all-affected interests, 
all which interests are affected by a decision ought to have a say in that 
12. Here I refer to evaluative similarities, i.e. similarities in the values relevant to their 
assessment, rather than to non-evaluative similarities (e.g. they both are ways of distributing 
decision-making powers between individuals).
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decision. 13 Since the goal of this paper is not to consider which principles 
may justify democracy in the state but to assess whether such principles 
apply equally to firms and states, let us assume that the principle of all-
affected interests is sufficient to justify democracy in the state. In considering 
whether it applies equally to both realms, we need to look at those individuals 
that are affected by decisions made by firms and by states and the extent to 
which their effects are similarly pervasive. We can distinguish between two 
sorts of effects  —namely, internal effects (i.e. effects on individuals who are 
members of the two sort of institutions under consideration) and external 
ones (i.e. effects on outsiders). Even though external effects turn out to be 
irrelevant for the issue at hand, let me briefly show why before turning to 
internal ones.
It has been often argued that firms’ decisions have a pervasive influence 
beyond the limits of the firm, both social and political. 14 Further, it has been 
claimed that such influence is as pervasive as the influence of states —if 
not more— in the case of large companies. For instance, in 1999, General 
Motors’ annual revenue was larger than the revenue of the Netherlands, 
Exxon Mobil’s revenue larger than Spain’s, DaimlerChrysler’s revenue larger 
than Canada’s, and so on (Chowla 2005: 3). As such, large companies’ social 
and political influence often resembles, if not exceeds, that of states. 
However, this analogy is irrelevant for the issue at hand for at least two 
reasons. 15 First, assuming that the analogy holds, it holds only —or to a much 
greater extent— for big businesses. The influence of small and medium 
businesses, by contrast, is not comparable to the influence of states. Second, 
even assuming that it holds for all firms, it does not have a bearing on the 
justification of democracy, neither within the state nor within firms. Under 
the principle of all-affected interests, all stakeholders, and not only workers, 
would have to be granted a say over firms’ decisions. Similarly, aliens who are 
affected by the externalities of the state, and not only citizens, would have to 
be granted a say over its decisions. Accordingly, stakeholder democracy and 
global democracy would obtain, rather than democracy within the firm and 
within the state.
Consider now the more interesting case of internal effects. It can 
be argued that decisions made by managers affect workers as much as 
decisions made by public officials and elected officials affect citizens. On 
the one hand, firms’ decisions can affect workers and their families directly 
13. For a discussion and defense of the principle, see Goodin (2007). For a criticism, see 
Saunders (2012).
14. As Néron (2010: 336) has put it, “[firms] control vast human, organizational, and 
financial resources, and labor; they influence national governments and local communities; 
and they support (directly and indirectly) everything from education to the arts and sports”.
15. I am grateful to two referees for this journal for pressing me to clarify this.
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through day-to-day commands or the setting up of the working conditions. 
For example, in Europe almost as many employees die on average due to 
fatal accidents in the workplace as citizens die due to intentional homicide. 16 
On the other hand, firms’ decisions can affect workers indirectly, as a side 
effect of strategic decisions such as production planning or relocation. The 
relevance of these internal effects is enhanced by two further facts. First, 
workers spend one third of their adult lives in their workplaces, probably 
more time than anywhere else. Second, given that work is a central source 
of self-esteem in modern economies, these effects do not have a merely 
instrumental importance to workers. They are also intrinsically important. 17 
In short, internal effects of firms’ decisions provide —assuming that the 
principle of all-affected interests suffices to justify democracy in the state— 
a robust candidate to ground the parallel-case argument. 
4.2. Standing
In defining the similarities between firms and states, most uses of the 
parallel-case argument have not focused on the influence of firms’ decisions 
in contrast with the influence of states. Rather, they have focused on workers’ 
standing in relation to firms as analogous to citizens’ standing in relation 
to the state and, notably, on the power exercised by managers and public 
officials. 18 This is a feature that is often seen, at least in the state, as sufficient 
to justify granting control rights to those over whom such power is exercised 
(and, again, I will assume that this is the case). Accordingly, it is not very 
surprising that this version of the argument has been dominant.
It is not very controversial that employees are subject to the power of 
their employers. In contrast to self-employment, in which workers exchange 
the product of their labor in the market, rather than their labor force, the 
very point of the employment relationship is the subordination of the 
worker to the command of the employer. In large firms, managers rather 
than owners exercise command on behalf of the latter in the daily running 
of the firm. Managers, thus, have power over employees because they have 
the ability to make the latter perform actions that they would not otherwise 
perform. What is controversial, then, is not so much whether employers and 
managers have power over employees. It is clear that they do. And almost 
as matter of definition, since managers’ ability to issue directives to which 
16. In the EU there were 2.5 fatal accidents per 100,000 persons employed in 2008 and 
3.5 intentional homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. See Eurostat (2012: 190) and United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Homicide statistics, at http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
data-and-analysis/homicide.html (accessed July 6, 2013). 
17. On normative issues related to work and self-esteem, see Schwartz (1982), Arneson 
(1992), and Moriarty (2009).
18. Dahl (1985) is the classic reference relying on the power exercised within the firm.
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employees have to conform is a core feature of the employment relationship. 
What is controversial is whether such power is similar to the power exercised 
by elected representatives and officials in the state. There are three potential 
differences between firms and states that might call into question that 
they are.
The first potential difference is that the power exercised by employers is 
more heavily constrained than the power exercised by elected officials. This 
could be the case because employers and employees sign a labor contract 
at the outset of the relationship that clearly specifies the terms under 
which the relationship will be conducted. By contrast, citizens and elected 
governments do not sign any such contract. True, in democratic countries 
citizens elect their representatives. But the latter enjoy ample discretion once 
they have been elected. They are not subject by binding instructions from 
the former, or by their own party manifesto. (It might be argued that party 
manifestos are contracts, but this is at most metaphorical because, unlike 
labor contracts, they are not legally binding). Accordingly, while employers’ 
exercise of power is heavily constrained (by the employment contract), the 
exercise of power by elected officials is not.
However, this difference is overdrawn. Neither the discretion of elected 
officials is completely unconstrained, nor is the discretion of managers 
completely constrained. In the state, elected officials are legally constrained 
by vertical and horizontal forms of accountability. First, they are subject to 
regular elections, in which they need to be reelected. This poses a de facto 
constraint on the extent to which they can deviate from their electoral 
promises and party manifestos while in office. Second, their power is legally 
constrained by the constitution and the checks and balances of the other 
branches of the state. Managers in firms, on the other hand, enjoy ample 
discretionary powers beyond the terms of their employment contracts 
because such contracts turn out to be incomplete when they are applied 
to concrete cases and unforeseeable contingencies. Since it would be 
impossible or prohibitively costly to anticipate every detail and contingency 
at the outset of such contract, and since some flexibility is desirable to 
adequately address such contingencies, employers are unavoidably granted 
ample discretion to issue commands. 19
A second potential difference is that —unlike citizens in non-democratic 
states, who do not have a say over decisions imposed upon them by public 
officials— employees in non-democratic firms do have a say over decisions 
imposed upon them. This is because they can elect the public officials 
who regulate the exercise of power in the workplace, and who decide, for 
that matter, whether the workplace should be democratized or not. Once 
19. I fully develop this argument in González-Ricoy (2014: 244-248).
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employees get their say in more general elections and are thus able to shape 
how corporations should operate, it may be argued, the case for democracy in 
the workplace becomes much weaker than the case for democracy in the state. 
This, however, does not make the power exercised by non-democratic 
managers of firms operating in democratic countries irrelevant. To see why, 
consider the case of a country in which democracy applies at the state level 
yet not at the municipal level. I take it that the fact that citizens can elect 
public officials at the state level does not make the power exercised by public 
officials at the municipal level irrelevant, even if the latter have to exercise 
their power within the democratic limits imposed by the former, just as it 
does not make the case for municipal democracy irrelevant. Analogously, 
the fact that workers have a say at the political level certainly makes a 
difference for the issue at hand, since it constrains the power that managers 
can exercise upon them. However, it does not make such power innocuous 
as far as managers enjoy some discretion (something that, as pointed out 
before, is intrinsic to the employment relationship), and it does not make 
the case for democracy in the workplace completely irrelevant as a result.
A third potential difference is that the power exercised in the firm is more 
easily avoidable than the power exercised by public officials. As Arneson 
(1993: 139) has argued, employees can “generally escape the reach of ... 
unwanted policies by quitting one’s job and taking another”. Citizens, by 
contrast, cannot leave their country and enter another one so easily, if at all. 
The sort of power to which employees and citizens are subjected is, thus, 
very different. This is an important potential difference that might block 
the analogy, and it has been extensively discussed in the relevant literature. 
For now, however, let us put it aside, for it will be discussed in some detail 
immediately below in section 5.1.
5. DIFFERENCES
In the previous section I have argued that the similarities between firms and 
states regarding their internal effects, as well as their similarities with regard 
to the exercise of power within them, are good candidates to ground the 
parallel-case argument. Assume that this is correct —or that some further 
similarities between firms and states exist, and that such similarities are, 
other things being equal, sufficient to favor democracy both in the state and 
the firm. Even if that is the case, however, these similarities only provide 
pro tanto reasons in favor of workplace democracy. Further differences 
between the firm and the state may end up overriding them, thus blocking 
the justification of workplace democracy on balance. In this subsection I will 
focus on three potential differences. First, firms are voluntary associations 
while states are not. Second, firms have well-defined purposes while states 
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are open-ended. Third, firms face stiff competition by other firms while 
states do not face a similar competition by other states.
5.1. Voluntariness
The potential difference that has dominated the debates about the parallel 
case is that firms are voluntary associations while states are not. As Arneson 
(1993: 139) claims, “The most significant disanalogy between states and 
firms is voluntariness”. The reason for this, according to Arneson and others 
(Narveson 1992; see also Dahl 1985; Mayer 2000; Hsieh 2008; Cordelli, 
unpublished), is that workers are entitled to leave economic enterprises at 
will, while leaving the state may be impossible or very costly. Two problems 
with how this debate has proceeded are (i) that the notion of voluntariness 
is rarely made explicit in full and (ii) that it is unclear whether the lack of exit 
rights necessarily entails that an association is involuntary (which most of the 
literature about the parallel-case argument assumes). Here I will not attempt 
to clarify these two problems. Rather, I will assume, following the relevant 
literature, that exit rights and the ability to exercise them without incurring 
excessive costs are necessary to deem an association voluntary. When the 
members of an association lack exit rights, or the costs of exercising them 
are unbearable (say, because of the absence of acceptable alternatives), then 
their agreement cannot be deemed fully voluntary. 20 In what follows, I will 
accordingly limit myself to discussing the potential differences between 
firms and states with this regard.
The basic reason why exit rights are deemed so crucial for voluntariness 
is that, when the members of an association are entitled to leave it without 
incurring excessive costs, by remaining inside of it they are taken to consent 
to the terms of the association. From this standpoint, firms might have been 
involuntary associations in nineteenth-century England, when Master and 
Servant Acts were in force and employees were criminally prosecuted for 
quitting their jobs. And involuntariness may sometimes persist nowadays 
in monopsonistic labor markets, or in markets of forced labor. 21 However, 
in free, competitive, and fully clearing labor markets, so the argument often 
goes, firms are voluntary associations because employees are entitled to 
20. Notice, however, that the sort of involuntariness that results from the lack of exit 
rights is different from the sort of involuntariness that would render a contract nonbinding, as 
Scanlon (2000: 245) suggests. The mere absence of exit rights does not exempt the parties, thus, 
from their duty to honor their agreements.
21. According to the ILO’s Forced Labour Convention No. 29, forced labor is all work or 
service that is exacted from any person under the threat of a penalty and for which the person 
has not offered herself voluntarily.
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quit at will. 22 By contrast, states are involuntary because exit is impossible 
or prohibitively costly.
Two important implications follow. The first one has to do with the 
analogy between firms and states regarding their internal effects and the 
exercise of power within them. While citizens can hardly escape such effects 
as well as the exercise of power by public officials, employees can generally 
avoid them by terminating their employment contracts. Further, employees 
can use such freedom as an implicit yet ever-present threat against their 
employers. As a result, the latter may well ex ante modify their behavior 
so as to incorporate the interests of their employees, thus minimizing the 
possibility of such freedom being exercised, thus reducing the employee 
turnover rate. This is not to say that freedom to exit completely rules out 
employers’ power over their employees, or that the latter are not affected 
by the decisions of the former any longer. Rather, it means that employees 
are affected and subjected by such decisions very differently, and to a lesser 
extent, from how citizens are.
The second implication follows from the first one. As I have argued in the 
previous section, the parallel-case argument can be grounded on the internal 
effects and the power exercised within firms and states being similar. Now, 
if they are not —because, unlike states, firms are voluntary associations, 
which members are entitled to join and leave at will— then the argument 
for workplace democracy based on the analogy turns out to be blocked. As 
Bowles and Gintis (1993: 97) put it, “if the capitalist economy is a sphere of 
voluntary private interactions, what is there to democratize?” Jan Narveson 
(1992: 53-54) nicely summarizes these two implications:
“If a firm doesn’t like the way you do your job, can it send men with guns 
who will put you in prison if you don’t do it the way the boss says? ... 
It is fundamental to politics that political association is not essentially 
voluntary ... Once a gathering is plainly voluntary, then there simply is no 
case for imposing “democratic” structures and procedures on it.”
However, this contrast between firms and states is overdrawn. Even though 
it is generally more costly to leave one’s country than to leave one’s job, 
the difference is one of degree, not of kind, for leaving one’s country is, at 
least formally, as possible as leaving one’s job. True, leaving one’s country is 
very costly. It includes serious obstacles such as closed borders, linguistic 
22. As a referee for this journal has suggested, markets might not need to fully clear for 
entry and exit from firms to be voluntary, provided that workers are sufficiently protected from 
unemployment, e.g. through employment benefits or a basic income. I have considered this 
alternative argument for the voluntariness of firms in González-Ricoy (2014: section 3). Here, 
however, I limit the analysis to the stronger argument according to which, even in the absence 
of such protection, entry and exit from firms in free and competitive markets is voluntary.
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barriers, and travel expenses, in addition to the fact that moving from one 
country to another usually implies changing jobs, while one can change jobs 
without changing countries. However, leaving one’s job does not go without 
sacrifice either.
Briefly consider the following reasons. 23 First, imperfect labor markets 
have involuntary unemployment, which makes it costly for employees 
to quit provided that they would not be able to find another job easily. 24 
Second, even if labor markets cleared, there are additional exit costs 
that can lock-in employees, including the following four: (i) investment 
costs in developing firm-specific human capital; (ii) integration costs in 
the network of co-workers, customers, etc.; (iii) searching and transition 
costs from one job to another; (iv) psychological costs in quitting work 
altogether provided that work is a relevant source of self-esteem in 
modern societies.
Third, in addition to these costs, freedom to exit, even when costless, may 
not be sufficient for voluntariness when the alternatives are not acceptable. 
To see why, consider the following case: 25
A is an employee who toils in a humiliating job and wishes to change jobs. 
For A, leaving her present job is both available and costless. As the labor 
market fully clears, A has numerous job alternatives available. However, 
all these alternatives are as humiliating as her present job. Eventually, A 
decides not to quit and stays at her present job. 
Is A’s decision fully voluntary? I take it that most of us would respond in the 
negative (even though, as I said above in note 20, not in a sense that would 
render A’s labor contract nonbinding), which shows that freedom to exit does 
not always suffice for voluntariness. When the range of options available to 
us is not acceptable, then formal exit rights, which A in the case above holds, 
do not suffice for voluntariness.
In short, leaving one’s job may be less costly than leaving one’s country. 
However, this is a difference of degree, not of kind, for leaving one’s job also 
has important costs. In addition, when acceptable alternatives are absent, 
freedom to exit, even when costless, does not suffice for voluntariness. 
Accordingly, any conclusion on the justification of democracy in the 
workplace drawn from the parallel-case argument would be less compelling 
than the corresponding justification of democracy in the state. Yet it would 
not be forceless.
23. I have developed these reasons in more detail in González-Ricoy (2014: 239-241).
24. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) have shown that, under conditions of imperfect 
information, this is also the case in perfectly competitive markets, which need a sufficiently 
large unemployment rate to remain competitive.
25. Serena Olsaretti (1998: 71) advances a similar example.
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Consider now two objections. 26 First, it might be argued that the 
mentioned costs, as well as the circumstances in which exit rights may be 
insufficient for involuntariness, vary enormously across employees and 
firms. For example, employees who possess scarce and valuable skills may 
bear lower costs if they quit than employees who lack such skills. However, 
these differences are also present in the state, in which exit costs are also 
very unevenly distributed across citizens and different states. Hence, some 
citizens might find it more costly to leave their country than others, and 
some countries may make it more costly for their citizens to leave than 
others. Accordingly, the analogy between firms and states regarding these 
differences holds and if democracy is justified in the state despite these 
differences, then it follows that it is justified in firms as well.
Second, even if democracy may be favored both in the state and in 
the workplace due to their similarly profound and unavoidable effects on 
citizens and workers, respectively, it may be objected that this argument can 
be blocked by appealing to the idea of freedom of economic association. 
Workers, it may be argued, have a right to freedom of economic association 
that empowers them to bind themselves to agree to obey commands of a 
non-democratic firm, and they have this power even if their set of valuable 
alternatives is very limited. I raise two points in response. First, as Joshua 
Cohen (1989: 48) has claimed in response to a similar objection, while it 
may be valuable to be able to choose the economic activity in which one 
engages as well as the parties with whom one associates, there may not be 
any fundamental interest protected by the liberty to sell labor for a wage 
and to be subjected to undemocratic command in the workplace instead 
of, say, working as a member of a co-operative. Second, even if we assume 
that freedom of economic association does entail a right to work for non-
democratic firms, this freedom does not necessarily override workers’ right 
to workplace democracy. Even though these two rights may sometimes 
conflict with each other, in the sort of economy envisaged by most 
proponents of workplace democracy —in which workplace democracy 
(unlike, say, mandatory schooling) is a right that can be alienated— it is not 
entirely implausible that both rights coexist. 27
26. I am grateful to a referee for this journal and to Andrew Williams for raising these 
objections.
27. According to Bowles and Gintis (1996: 66), for example, “to argue against mandatory 
workplace democracy is to critique a straw man and to elide the fundamental issue, which 
concerns whether policies promoting workplace democracies are justified in the interest of 
giving workers the opportunity to participate in these forms of governance”. 
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5.2. Narrowness of Purposes
Consider now a further yet related difference, namely, that firms are justified 
in having well-defined purposes, e.g. to maximize profits, while states ought 
to be open-ended, as Phillips and Margolis (1999) have argued. A reason 
for this is that, unlike firms, states are not voluntary associations. Firms are 
justified in having narrow purposes their employees can always leave if they 
disagree with such purposes. States, by contrast, have to remain open-ended 
because their citizens cannot leave them easily if they disagree. Hence, while 
it is acceptable for a firm to have certain narrow goals (say, produce and sell 
copies of the Bible), it is unacceptable for the state to do so.
An implication of this difference for the issue at hand is the following. 
When the goals of an organization are well defined and disagreement about 
them among its members is not very profound, the need for a collective 
decision-making procedure, democratic or otherwise, to set the goals that 
ought to be pursued is also weaker. 28 When, by contrast, goals are subject to 
more profound disagreements, the need for a decision-making procedure 
to handle such disagreements is stronger. It thus follows that if states are 
open-ended and have plural goals while firms have narrow purposes, then 
the case for democratic procedures in the state is stronger than the case for 
democratic procedures in the firm.
There are good reasons, however, to resist this clear-cut distinction. 
Firstly, according to Phillips and Margolis, purpose narrowness is allowed 
in firms and open-endedness is required in the state due to the fact that the 
former are voluntary organizations while the latter are not. However, as we 
have seen in the previous section, this difference is overdrawn, for exit from 
firms is often costly and the decision to stay, thus, not always fully voluntary 
(at least under the definition of voluntariness used before, which requires 
that meaningful exit rights are available and that does not necessarily render 
employment contracts nonbinding). Now, if firms are not fully voluntary 
associations, then the case for purpose narrowness becomes weaker and the 
difference between firms and states regarding the narrowness of their goals 
becomes less clear-cut.
There are further reasons to call into question that purpose narrowness 
should be allowed in firms and open-endedness should be required in the 
state. On the one hand, it is certainly the case that some libertarians have 
argued not only that making profits is perfectly respectable for economic 
enterprises, but also that it should be their only goal (typically, Friedman 
28. As Przeworski (2006: 312) has put it, democracy presupposes, as a necessary condition, 
that “Interests or values are in conflict. If they were not, if interests were harmonious or values 
were unanimously shared, anyone’s decisions would be accepted by all, so that anyone could be 
a benevolent dictator”. A similar argument can be found in Waldron (1999) and Valentini (2012).
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1970). However, this position has not gone without challenge, not least by 
Corporate Social Responsibility approaches and stakeholder theorists. 
Indeed, it is widely assumed nowadays that firms should have a diversity 
of goals, social and otherwise, other than maximizing profits. On the other 
hand, the requirement of open-endedness in the state can also be called into 
question. Today, it is widely accepted that states have to comply with a number 
of narrow goals that constrain their sovereignty, including the fulfillment of 
human rights and the responsibility to protect their population. 29
In short, neither firms ought to have narrow purposes, nor the state ought 
to be completely open-ended. Of course, this does not imply that firms and 
states ought to have similar goals (just as different firms have different goals). 
It rather implies that the difference between firms and states regarding the 
narrowness of their goals is less clear-cut than it is sometimes argued and 
that, given that firms should also have plural purposes, the argument for 
ruling out the use of democratic procedures in their governance turns out to 
be less compelling.
5.3. Toughness and Efficiency
Jeffrey Moriarty (2005) has advanced a further difference that may have 
a bearing on the assessment of the parallel-case argument, namely, the 
tougher environment that firms face in the market compared to states in the 
international realm. In free-market economies, firms face stiff competition 
from other firms that attempt to drive them out from the market. They face 
continuous and rapid changes due to the appearance of new technologies 
and products, changes in consumers’ preferences, the introduction of 
new legislation, periodical economic downturns that make them likely 
to disappear, and so on. Indeed, the US Census Bureau reports that the 
one-year failure rate for firms started in 2004 is 23.6 percent and the five-
year failure rate for firms started in 2000 is 49.3 percent (Headd 2010). By 
contrast, states face a less tough environment. They are much more resilient 
to changing circumstances, and their downfall is rare or at least rarer than 
in the case of firms. 
Two relevant implications follow from this difference. First, Moriarty 
claims that managers in firms should be granted extensive powers to face 
stiff competition in the market, as well as the ability to exercise them fast, that 
public officials need not have or not to the same extent. In times of economic 
downturn, he reckons, managers may need to be able to cut employees’ pay, 
give shareholders smaller returns, or renegotiate contracts with suppliers, 
provided that some minimal constraints (e.g. safety conditions) are respected. 
29. A classic contemporary defense of human rights as constraints on state sovereignty is 
Rawls (1999).
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Public officials, by contrast, need not have this sort of power, or not to the 
same degree. The environment they face is less tough, and dissolution of 
the state less likely to ever happen. Second, even though this is a point that 
Moriarty does not make, it may also be claimed that stiff competition and the 
constant threat of downfall make efficiency, in terms of the ratio of output to 
input, more important in the firm than in the state.
The bearing of these two implications on the parallel-case argument is 
that both the need for extensive prerogatives and the crucial importance of 
efficiency may conflict with democratic decision-making, which may be too 
slow to adapt to changing environments, and may be less efficient than other 
decision-making arrangements. 30 Accordingly, since the need for extensive 
prerogatives and the importance of efficiency due to stiff competition is 
greater in the firm than in the state, democratic decision-making may be 
less suitable in the former than in the latter. These differences, in turn, may 
block the parallel-case argument for democracy in the workplace or, at least, 
make any conclusion drawn from other similarities that firms and states 
may share less compelling.
This is an important argument for, as the figures above suggest, 
firms certainly face stiffer competition than states. Three replies can be 
advanced, though. First, governments also face tough circumstances, and 
the availability of emergency powers and the importance of efficiency may 
also be crucial in the governance of the state. As Moriarty acknowledges, 
the difference between firms and states in this regard is one of degree, not 
of kind. 31 Second, as it has been argued above, democracy in the workplace 
is not at odds with delegation of extensive prerogatives to managers, with 
the only difference that managers in democratic firms are appointed by 
workers rather than, or along with, shareholders, and accountable to them. 
Third, it has been much discussed whether democracy in the workplace 
diminishes or improves efficiency. 32 This issue largely exceeds the scope 
of this paper. However, it may be too quick to assume that efficiency is at 
odds with democracy, either in the workplace or in the state. There are good 
theoretical and empirical grounds to believe that the contrary may be the 
30. Classic references on the inefficiency of democratic firms are Jensen and Meckling 
(1979) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
31. As Andrew Williams has suggested to me, it may be argued that competition is not only 
a fact but also a desirable fact in the economic domain, given the benefits of creative destruction. 
The same, however, may not be true in the political domain, since the social costs of political 
bankruptcy are so much higher. While this may entail that the difference is ultimately of kind, I 
leave it open whether the difference holds, for it implies a moral assessment of the benefits of 
competition that, regarding the economic domain, is highly contested to say the least.
32. Some have argued that the fact that democratic firms are marginal shows that 
democratic firms are not efficient, for otherwise they would be created voluntarily. See Jensen 
and Meckling (1979). Elster (1989) has replied that they could be marginal due to endogenous 
preference formation, adverse selection, discrimination, and externalities.
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case, at least under certain circumstances (see Bowles and Gintis 1993; 
Parks et al., 2004; Levin 2006; for overviews of the debates, see Dow 2003; 
Hansmann 2000).
In short, the difference in toughness that firms and states face is one of 
degree. It should not be overdrawn when assessing the limits to the parallel 
between firms and states. In addition, the difference might turn out not to 
have much bearing on the parallel-case argument, first, because democratic 
firms are consistent with the sort of powers that tough market competition 
may require and, second, because, they may not be inefficient in their 
operation.
6. CONCLUSIONS
If the features upon which the analogy between firms and states is based 
turn out to be sufficient to justify democracy in the state, then the parallel-
case argument provides a plausible reason in favor of democracy in the 
workplace —a reason, however, that needs to be importantly qualified, I 
conclude, for a number of reasons. First, while the paper has shown that 
firms and states are similar regarding their internal effects and the power 
exercised within them, it has not attempted to demonstrate that these 
features are morally sufficient to justify democracy in the state. Second, the 
paper has shown that there are a number of morally relevant differences 
that could override, or at least undermine, the similarities upon which the 
analogy between firms and states is based —even though it has also shown 
that these differences are often overdrawn, for they are of degree, not of 
kind. Third, further differences that have not been considered here may 
further undermine the analogy between firms and states, thus blocking 
the parallel-case argument in favor of workplace democracy. In short, 
the case for democracy in the workplace, when drawn from the analogy 
between firms and states, and provided that democracy is justified in the 
state, is plausible. Yet it is also not as strong as the case for democracy in the 
state. McMahon (1994: 259) is thus right in acknowledging that “the case 
for democracy in nongovernmental organizations is weaker than the case 
for democratic government”, at least, when based upon the parallel-case 
argument. 
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